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A Resilient Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme
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Abstract A resilient secret sharing scheme is supposed to generate the secret
correctly even after some shares are damaged. In this paper, we show how quantum
error correcting codes can be exploited to design a resilient quantum secret sharing
scheme, where a quantum state is shared among more than one parties.
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Undoing Quantum Measurement
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1 Introduction
The quantum teleportation of a single qubit was first proposed by Bennett et
al. [2], using a maximally entangled bipartite quantum state. The idea of telepor-
tation has been successfully applied in the process of quantum secret sharing. In
quantum teleportation, Alice sends a qubit to a distant receiver Bob through some
unitary operation involving the qubit and the entangled channel shared between
them. Further results related to quantum teleportation, that can be exploited in
quantum secret sharing, include results using multipartite quantum channels such
as tripartite GHZ state [8], four-partite GHZ state [16], an asymmetric W state [1]
and the cluster state [3]. The perfect teleportation of an arbitrary two-qubit state
was proposed using quantum channels formed by the tensor product of two Bell
states [19], tensor product of two orthogonal states [22], genuinely entangled five
qubit state [12], five qubit cluster state [11] and six qubit genuinely entangled
states [10].
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Fig. 1 Circuit diagram for 3 qubit phase flip repetition code
The idea of Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) of a single qubit was first due
to Hilery et al. [7] using three and four qubit GHZ states. Later this process
was investigated by Karlsson et al. [9] using three particle entanglement, Cleve et
al. [4] using a process similar to error correction and Zheng using W state [26]. The
QSS of an arbitrary two-qubit state was proposed by Deng et al. using two GHZ
states [5]. QSS using cluster states was demonstrated by Nie [14], Panigrahi [17,
13] and Han [6]. Recently two qubit QSS was discussed using arbitrary pure or
mixed resource states [25] and asymmetric multipartite state [24].
In this paper we do not exploit the ideas related to teleportation in quantum se-
cret sharing. The idea of teleportation does not naturally take care of the situation
when some adversarial model is considered where some shares may be disturbed.
Rather, we use quantum error correcting codes to take care of the situation. There
exist some works [18,23] for building quantum secret sharing schemes using (classi-
cal or quantum) error correcting codes. However, none of these schemes addresses
the resiliency issue.
An arbitrary pure single-qubit quantum state is given by |ψ〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉
with |α|2+ |β|2 = 1, where α, β ∈ C. In quantum error correction scheme known as
repetition code [15], the above state is encoded as α |000〉+ β |111〉. This encoding
can correct a single bit-flip error. In [20], the authors pointed out that any mea-
surement in the computational basis states |0〉, |1〉 causes a projection onto the σz
axis of the Bloch sphere and can be interpreted as an incoherent phase flip. Hence,
any protocol correcting against phase flips is sufficient to reverse measurements in
the computational basis. The repetition code can be modified to protect against
such phase-flip errors by a simple basis change from |0〉, |1〉 to |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉).
The schematic diagram for undoing a quantum measurement is given in Fig-
ure 1. This idea [20] motivated us to devise a novel quantum secret sharing protocol
based on quantum error correcting codes. It is resilient in the sense that it survives
when the line of Bob or Charlie or both is compromised.
1.1 Our contribution
In light of the above discussion, let us now explain our exact proposal and its
importance. In line of Figure 1, we also like to refer to Figure 2. At the bottom
of the figure, |ψi〉 below each column denotes the joint 3-qubit state immediately
after the application of the gates in that column. For example, |ψ3〉 is the state
after the application of three Hadamard gates in the right half of the diagram.
The single qubit state |ψ〉, as in Figure 2, is to be distributed between three
parties Alice, Bob and Charlie. Two additional |1〉 qubits are used by the dis-
tributor for this purpose. Each individual particle of the three qubit state |ψ3〉 is
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Fig. 2 Schematic diagram for our quantum secret sharing scheme
distributed to Alice, Bob and Charlie. Without loss of generalization, it is consid-
ered that when they come together to generate the secret, then Bob and Charlie
will co-operate with Alice and the secret will be generated with Alice. The particle
with Alice corresponding to the three-qubit state |ψ8〉 should be same as |ψ〉 for a
successful execution of the protocol.
We claim that our model is resilient. We consider that Bob or Charlie may
cheat. This is pointed out by marking “Eaves” instead in the figure. As an example,
by cheating, we mean that Bob or Charlie may measure their individual qubits in
certain basis to gain some information about the secret state |ψ〉. In our protocol,
Alice can detect cheating with certain probabilities if either Bob or Charlie or
both Bob and Charlie cheat(s). Further, the cheater will not be able to obtain any
information about the secret state from the particle associated with him.
One can consider that parties other than Alice, Bob and Charlie may also be
interested to gain information about the secret to disturb the protocol. However, it
is enough to consider that Bob and Charlie themselves may play that adversarial
role. We consider that Alice will be honest and the secret will be prepared by her
in cooperation with Bob and Charlie.
Let us present an example. Consider that the cheating is done by Bob and/or
Charlie and they measure in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis. Alice will not disturb the particle that
is with her, but in case of cheating, she has to operate a phase gate to get back
the secret. On the other hand, Alice can always measure the other two particles
corresponding to Bob and Charlie. Thus, Alice can measure those two qubits in
{|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} basis to obtain relevant information regarding cheating.
To the best of our knowledge, for quantum secret sharing, there exists no such
scheme in literature that can decide
– whether the cheating is done,
– whether the expected state is generated or not and
– whether the exact state could be achieved after some transformation.
2 The Proposed Secret Sharing Protocol
First, the dealer D encodes the secret using the encoding circuit (left part of
Figure 2, up to |ψ3〉). The dealer then distributes all three qubits among the
participants: Alice, Bob and Charlie. Each of them applies Hadamard gate after
getting the qubits. Now, one of them, say Alice, decides to generate the secret and
so the other two delivers their qubits to Alice.
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Alice applies two CNOT gates (as shown in Fig 2) considering her qubit as
the control. Next, she applies Toffoli gates considering Bob and Charlie’s bits
as control. Then she applies Hadamard (H) and phase (Z) gates to generate the
secret at her end. Alice measures the particles corresponding to Bob and Charlie
in {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} basis.
– If she gets |11〉, she decides that no cheating has been done in the process.
– If she gets |01〉, she understands that cheating is done by Bob.
– If she gets |10〉, she understands that cheating is performed by Charlie.
– If she gets |00〉, she knows that both Bob and Charlie have cheated.
In all three cases related to cheating, she has to apply a phase gate to generate
the secret. On the other hand we have the following cases related to cheating.
– If Bob has cheated by measuring in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, then Alice will observe
either |01〉 or |11〉 with probability 1
2
each.
– If Charlie has cheated by measuring in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, then Alice will observe
either |10〉 or |11〉 with probability 1
2
each.
– If both Bob and Charlie have cheated by measuring their particle in {|0〉 , |1〉}
basis individually, then Alice will observe any of |00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉 with prob-
ability 1
4
each.
Thus, in any case, the secret quantum state will be created perfectly. However,
Alice will be able to understand whether the cheating has been done with certain
probabilities.
2.1 Detailed Calculation
We show the step-by-step evolution of the joint state as the protocol runs from
left to right in Figure 2. We can write
|ψ0〉 = (α |0〉+ β |1〉) |1〉 |1〉 .
After the application of the Hadamard gate, the joint state becomes
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
[α (|0〉+ |1〉) + β (|0〉 − |1〉)] |1〉 |1〉 .
After the application of the two CNOT gates, the state becomes
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
[α (|011〉+ |100〉) + β (|011〉 − |100〉)] .
Next, the dealer applies three Hadamard gates, one on each line, yielding the state
|ψ3〉 = 1
2
[α (|000〉 − |110〉+ |011〉 − |101〉) + β (|100〉 − |010〉 − |001〉+ |111〉)] .
(1)
Now, the dealer distributes this state amongst Alice, Bob and Charlie, one particle
to each. After getting the qubits, each party applies Hadamard on his/her qubit.
So the resultant state becomes
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2
[α (|011〉+ |100〉) + β (|011〉 − |100〉)] = |ψ2〉 .
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After two CNOT gates, the state becomes
|ψ5〉 = 1√
2
[α (|011〉+ |111〉) + β (|011〉 − |111〉)] .
Next, after application of the Toffoli gate, the state becomes
|ψ6〉 = 1√
2
[α (|0〉+ |1〉)− β (|0〉 − |1〉)] |1〉 |1〉 .
After the last Hadamard gate, it reduces to
|ψ7〉 = (α |0〉 − β |1〉) |1〉 |1〉 .
The phase gate in the end converts this state into
|ψ8〉 = (α |0〉+ β |1〉) |1〉 |1〉 = |ψ0〉 .
Now Alice measures her ancilla in the {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} basis. In case she gets
|11〉, she knows that the secret has been successfully generated.
3 Resiliency of the scheme and analysis of cheating
In this section, we analyze what happens when Bob or Charlie or both tries to
cheat to the corresponding lines. We do not consider any other eavesdropper as
any cheating by other parties can also be done by Bob and Charlie themselves.
3.1 When Bob attempts cheating
As Bob wants to get some information about the secret, the way we consider is
to measure the qubit just after he receives it. Assuming that he measures in the
computational basis, he gets |0〉 with probability 1
2
and |1〉 with probability 1
2
.
We have the state |ψ3〉 in hand. Suppose Bob gets |0〉. From Equation (1), we
can write the remaining two-qubit state as
∣∣∣ψAC3
〉
=
1√
2
[α (|00〉 − |11〉) + β (|10〉 − |01〉)] .
After the measurement by Bob, he again replaces the measured qubit (here |0〉).
Then each of Alice, Bob and Charlie applies Hadamard, and the joint state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C4
〉
=
1
2
[α (|001〉+ |100〉+ |110〉+ |011〉) + β (|001〉 − |100〉 − |110〉+ |011〉)] .
Now, Bob and Charlie give their qubits to Alice. Alice applies CONTs considering
her qubit as control. Then the overall state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C5
〉
=
1
2
[α (|001〉+ |111〉+ |101〉+ |011〉) + β (|001〉 − |111〉 − |101〉+ |011〉)] .
Next, Alice operates Toffoli considering Bob and Charlie’s qubits as control. Then
we get
∣∣∣ψAB′0C6
〉
=
1
2
[α (|0〉+ |1〉) (|01〉+ |11〉) + β (|0〉 − |1〉) (|01〉 − |11〉)] .
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Now, Alice applies Hadamard on the first qubit. Thus, the resultant state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C7
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉 − β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉+ β |1〉) |01〉] .
After Alice applies the last phase gate, the state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C8
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉 − β |1〉) |01〉] . (2)
Now, Alice measures the particles corresponding to Bob and Charlie in the
basis {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉}. In this case, she gets |11〉 with probability 1
2
and |01〉
with probability 1
2
. In the first case, she gets back the secret, but cannot detect that
Bob has cheated. In the second case, she discovers that Bob has indeed cheated
and she can get back the secret by applying one more phase gate to her qubit.
Similarly, when Bob measures |1〉, the final state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′1C8
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |11〉 − (α |0〉 − β |1〉) |01〉] . (3)
As can be seen by comparing Equations (2) and (3), we get the same result after
Alice measures the particles corresponding to Bob and Charlie in computational
basis.
3.2 When Charlie attempts cheating
In a similar manner, Charlie measures his qubit just after he receives it. Assuming
that he measures in the computational basis, he gets |0〉 with probability 1
2
and
|1〉 with probability 1
2
.
Suppose Charlie obtains |0〉. From Equation (1), we can write the remaining
two-qubit state as
∣∣∣ψAB3
〉
=
1√
2
[α (|00〉 − |11〉) + β (|10〉 − |01〉)] .
Now, each applies Hadamard on the respective input and the joint state becomes
∣∣∣ψABC′04
〉
=
1
2
[α (|100〉+ |010〉+ |011〉+ |101〉)− β (|100〉 − |010〉 − |011〉+ |101〉)] .
Now, Bob and Charlie give their qubits to Alice. Alice applies CONTs considering
her qubit as control. Then she obtains the overall state as
∣∣∣ψABC′05
〉
=
1
2
[α (|111〉+ |010〉+ |011〉+ |110〉)− β (|111〉 − |010〉 − |011〉+ |110〉)] .
Next, Alice operates Toffoli considering Bob and Charlie’s qubits as control. Then
we get
∣∣∣ψABC′06
〉
=
1
2
[α (|0〉+ |1〉) (|11〉+ |10〉)− β (|0〉 − |1〉) (|11〉 − |10〉)] .
Now, Alice applies Hadamard on the first qubit. Thus, the resultant state becomes
∣∣∣ψABC′07
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉 − β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉+ β |1〉) |10〉] .
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After Alice applies the last phase gate, the state becomes
∣∣∣ψABC′08
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉 − β |1〉) |10〉] . (4)
Alice measures the qubits of Bob and Charlie in {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} basis. In
this case, she gets |11〉 with probability 1
2
and |10〉 with probability 1
2
. In the first
case, she gets back the secret, but cannot detect that Charlie tried to cheat. In the
second case, she knows for certain that Charlie has indeed cheated and she can
get back the secret simply by applying one more phase gate to her qubit.
Similarly, when Charlie measures |1〉, the final state becomes
∣∣∣ψABC′18
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |11〉 − (α |0〉 − β |1〉) |10〉] . (5)
As can be seen by comparing Equations (4) and (5), we get the same result.
3.3 When both Bob and Charlie are Eavesdroppers
Assume that both Bob and Charlie measure in the computational basis. Suppose,
Bob gets |0〉 and Charlie also gets |0〉. From Equation (1), we can write the re-
maining state as ∣∣∣ψA3
〉
= α |0〉+ β |1〉 .
After each applies Hadamard, the joint state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′04
〉
=
1
2
√
2
[α (|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉+ |011〉+ |100〉+ |101〉+ |110〉+ |111〉)
+β (|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉+ |011〉 − |100〉 − |101〉 − |110〉 − |111〉)] .
Now, Bob and Charlie give their qubits to Alice. Alice applies CONTs considering
her qubit as control. It can be easily verified that after this, the overall state
remains the same, i.e.,
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′05
〉
=
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′04
〉
.
Next, Alice operates Toffoli considering Bob and Charlie’s qubits as control.
Then we get the resultant state as
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′06
〉
=
1
2
√
2
[α (|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉+ |011〉+ |100〉+ |101〉+ |110〉+ |111〉)
+β (|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉 − |011〉 − |100〉 − |101〉 − |110〉+ |111〉)] .
Now, Alice applies Hadamard on the first qubit. Thus, the resultant state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′07
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉 − β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉+ β |1〉) (|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉)] .
After Alice applies the last phase gate, the state becomes
∣∣∣ψAB′0C′07
〉
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |11〉+ (α |0〉 − β |1〉) (|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉)] .
Now, Alice measures the qubits of Bob and Charlie in {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} ba-
sis. In this case, she gets each basis state with probability 1
4
. The cases can be
summarized as follows.
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– If she gets |11〉, she gets back the secret, but cannot detect if anyone tried to
eavesdrop.
– If she gets |01〉, she knows that Bob was eavesdropping.
– If she gets |10〉, she knows that Charlie was eavesdropping.
– If she gets |00〉, she knows that both Bob and Charlie were eavesdropping.
By similar analysis of the cases when Bob and Charlie measure the other three
possible pairs of outputs, we get the same result.
4 Analysis of Arbitrary Measurements
The protocol that we discussed can withstand errors introduced due to measure-
ment by the advisory in the computational basis. If the advisory performs the
measurement in other basis, then the secret may not be recovered. In this section
we first analyse what happens when the adversary measures in arbitrary basis and
then discuss how our secret sharing protocol can be modified to tolerate measure-
ment in any basis.
4.1 Analysis of Measurement in Arbitrary Basis
Let Bob (without loss of generality) measure in {|γ〉 ,
∣∣∣γ⊥〉} basis, where |γ〉 =
a |0〉+ b |1〉 and
∣∣∣γ⊥〉 = b∗ |0〉 − a∗ |1〉, with a, b ∈ C and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Then we
can write |0〉 = a∗ |γ〉+ b
∣∣∣γ⊥〉 and |1〉 = b∗ |γ〉 − a
∣∣∣γ⊥〉.
Thus, we can rewrite Equation (1) as
|ψ3〉 = 1
2
[α (|000〉 − |110〉+ |011〉 − |101〉) + β (|100〉 − |010〉 − |001〉+ |111〉)]
=
1
2
[
α
(
|0〉 (a∗ |γ〉+ b
∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |0〉 − |1〉 (b∗ |γ〉 − a
∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |0〉
+ |0〉 (b∗ |γ〉 − a
∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |1〉 − |1〉 (a∗ |γ〉+ b ∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |1〉)
+β
(
|1〉 (a∗ |γ〉+ b
∣∣∣γ⊥〉)|0〉 − |0〉 (b∗ |γ〉 − a ∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |0〉
− |0〉 (a∗ |γ〉+ b
∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |1〉+ |1〉 (b∗ |γ〉 − a
∣∣∣γ⊥〉) |1〉)] .
When Bob measures this state in {|γ〉 ,
∣∣∣γ⊥〉} basis, it can be easily seen that
she gets each of |γ〉 and
∣∣∣γ⊥〉 with probability 1
2
.
Suppose Bob observes |γ〉. The remaining state becomes
∣∣∣ψAC3
〉
=
1√
2
[
α
(
a∗ |00〉 − b∗ |10〉+ b∗ |01〉 − a∗ |11〉)
+ β
(
a∗ |10〉 − b∗ |00〉 − a∗ |01〉+ b∗ |11〉)] .
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After each applies Hadamard, the joint state becomes
∣∣∣∣ψAB
′
γ
C
4
〉
=
1
2
[
(αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a+ b) |001〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a+ b) |100〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a− b) |110〉
+ (αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a− b) |011〉] .
Now, Bob and Charlie give their qubits to Alice. Alice applies CONTs considering
her qubit as control. Then the overall state becomes∣∣∣∣ψAB
′
γ
C
5
〉
=
1
2
[
(αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a+ b) |001〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a+ b) |111〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a− b) |101〉
+ (αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a− b) |011〉] .
Next, Alice operates Toffoli considering Bob and Charlie’s qubits as control.
Then we get ∣∣∣∣ψAB
′
γ
C
6
〉
=
1
2
[
(αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a+ b) |001〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a+ b) |011〉
+(αa∗ − βb∗ + αb∗ − βa∗)(a− b) |101〉
+ (αa∗ − βb∗ − αb∗ + βa∗)(a− b) |111〉] .
Now, Alice applies Hadamard on the first qubit. Thus, the resultant state becomes
∣∣∣∣ψAB
′
γ
C
7
〉
=
1√
2
[((
α− β(ab∗ + a∗b)) |0〉+ (α(ab∗ + a∗b)− β) |1〉) |11〉
+
((
α(|a|2 − |b|2) + β(a∗b− ab∗)
)
|0〉
−
(
α(ab∗ − a∗b) + β(|b|2 − |a|2)
)
|1〉
)
|01〉
]
.
After Alice applies the last phase gate, the state becomes∣∣∣∣ψAB
′
γ
C
8
〉
=
1√
2
[((
α− β(ab∗ + a∗b)) |0〉 − (α(ab∗ + a∗b)− β) |1〉) |11〉
+
((
α(|a|2 − |b|2) + β(a∗b− ab∗)
)
|0〉
+
(
α(ab∗ − a∗b) + β(|b|2 − |a|2)
)
|1〉
)
|01〉
]
. (6)
Note that due to the measurement, α is shifted to α′ = α− β(ab∗+ a∗b) and β
is shifted to β′ = β − α(ab∗ + a∗b). Thus, depending on the values of a and b, the
secret evolves.
Similar analysis holds for the case when Bob measures
∣∣∣γ⊥〉. Continuing with
the analysis of Bob’s measurement as |γ〉, we find that when Alice measures the
qubits corresponding to Bob and Charlie in {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉} basis, she gets
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|11〉 with probability 1
2
and |01〉 with probability 1
2
. Note that if one takes a =
1, b = 0, then Equation (6) coincides with Equation (2). On the other hand, if one
takes a = 0, b = 1, then Equation (6) coincides with Equation (3).
Next, let us consider the case a = b = 1√
2
, i.e., the measurement basis is
{|+〉 , |−〉}. In this case, when Bob measures |+〉, Equation (6) reduced to
∣∣∣ψAB′+C8
〉
=
1√
2
(α− β) (|0〉 − |1〉) |11〉 .
Upon measuring her ancilla bits in the computational basis, Alice would get wrong
information that there is no eavesdropping. Moreover, the state is also not recov-
ered properly at Alice’s end. Similar cases can be analysed considering Charlie or
both.
Thus, if the participants go for a measurement in arbitrary basis, then it is
not possible to reconstruct the secret with simple quantum error correcting codes.
However, with codes that can correct any kind of error, it is possible to design
quantum secret sharing schemes that are more resilient. Below we outline this
extension.
4.2 Possible Resiliency against Arbitrary Operations by Cheaters
In this section, we discuss remedies against not only arbitrary measurements but
also arbitrary interactions by the Cheaters. The protocol described in Section 2
uses three qubit phase flip repetition code. Here, we modify the protocol with nine
qubit Shor code [21]. This code is a combination of three qubit phase flip and bit
flip codes. The qubit is first encoded using the phase flip code, i.e., |0〉 is encoded
as |+++〉 and |1〉 is represented as |− − −〉. Next, each of these qubits are encoded
using three qubit bit flip code, i.e., |+〉 is encoded as |000〉+ |111〉)/√2 and |−〉 is
encoded as |000〉 − |111〉)/√2.
Suppose, before the interaction by the adversary, the state of the system is
|ψABC〉. Any error Υ , including the one due to interaction, can be analyzed by
expanding it in an operator-sum representation with operation elements {Ei}, we
would have the post-interaction state as
Υ |ψABC〉 〈ψABC | =
∑
i
Ei |ψABC〉 〈ψABC |E†i .
As an operator, Ei can be expanded as a linear combination of the identity, the bit
flip X, the phase flip Z and the combined bit and phase flip XZ. Measuring the er-
ror syndrome would collapse this superposition into one of the four states, namely,
|ψABC〉, X |ψABC〉, Z |ψABC〉 and XZ |ψABC〉. By applying the appropriate inverse
operation, the recovery is possible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show how quantum error correcting codes can be suitably used to
present quantum secret sharing schemes with certain kind of resiliency. Our work
is not in the line of mostly studied quantum secret sharing that lends the idea
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from teleportation. We explain the basic idea with a simple code and point out its
merits and demerits. We also outline how any arbitrary adversarial attempt can
be resisted with more complicated quantum error correcting codes. Detailed study
with different kinds of access structures and finding out suitable error correcting
codes are important as future works in this direction.
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